In her excellent reflections about history for non-historians, Danielle C. Kinsey notes that peer-reviewers balked at the idea of explaining history as a discipline. This strikes me as a rather defensive position. Not all historians are surrounded by other historians. Some of us are appointed to positions where we regularly enter discussions about what it is historians do. This is a discussion that takes place at a different level than how we write about historiography or the relationship between history and other disciplines. For historians, there are benefits to seeing ourselves through the eyes of non-historians. These are both practical for our profession and helpful in working out our own understanding of what history is. Kinsey's piece also suggests that discussions with non-historians can be more thoughtful and successful. She is correct. In this piece, I draw on my experience to suggest some ways that this can unfold, juxtaposing history and sociology to make the point. I am a historian appointed to a sociology department, where I teach legal studies. In this position I encounter both colleagues and students who seek to understand what it is historians do. Kinsey's piece makes a convincing argument that we can offer better explanations.
Sociology is a useful example to contrast with history, but a similar conversation could easily unfold about other disciplines in the social sciences. When sociologists or intellectual historians unravel the pedigree of these two disciplines they conclude that they are essentially the same pursuit, but aimed in different directions. 1 To draw on one example, George Novack describes an "unbreakable interdependence" in the interaction between sociology and other social science disciplines. He writes, "to the degree that sociology succeeds in comprehending the laws of human development, it provides other social sciences with a general method of investigation which can serve as a guide to their more specialised studies." 2 Yet a divide exists primarily in how each discipline sees itself. This is connected to both history and sociology's evolution of seeing themselves as scientific disciplines. To return to Novack briefly, his 1966 essay on history and sociology discusses a very early development within the historical discipline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which positivism and ideology diverged. He writes, "[T]he authors of the conjectures associated with the philosophy of history were ideological precursors and progenitors of sociology." 3 There is still something of this divide with us today. My sense is that historians are viewed by other disciplines in a positivist tradition. Non-academics replicate this too. Students can easily best my grasp of detail and fact by reading Wikipedia while I lecture, and sometimes I fail the newspaper history quiz on Canada day. But this proves very little about me as a historian. The positivist model is not how historians see themselves, as we would certainly still lay claim to the philosophical and pursuit of knowledge about the past. But we can acknowledge better that others are failing to see us in the same way.
Talking to Sociologists and other Non-Historians
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In the spirit of Kinsey's practical advice, I'll move away quickly from philosophical or theoretical considerations of the relationship between history and sociology. The point here is that most of us have read some combination of Marx, Bourdieu, Lukács, or Elias and have thought about the philosophical origins and intersection of these two disciplines, but we are rather less considerate about how this unfolds in practice. George Steinmetz notes that the history-sociology relationship is characterized by "mistrust and misunderstanding," a characterization that he would also extend beyond sociology and to a larger sweep of social sciences. 4 This assessment is fair and speaks to Kinsey's larger point. It falls to us as historians to push beyond this mistrust and insularity about our professional methods, goals, and aims.
A clear lesson I have learned from sociologists is that historians can be far more effective when talking about our methods. For sociologists, the methodological foundations of their research are deeply embedded in how they think and talk about what they do. This seems particularly true of those who use quantitative and statistical research methods. Sociologists are comfortable being associated with their methodology. In contrast, historical methodology seems to become a more homogenous entity when we talk about it outside of our discipline. Rather than methods, we tend to talk about topics. This person studies military history, this person legal history, another the history of architecture. With these associations comes a presumption of expertise. Soon after finishing my PhD, I was introduced by a well-meaning moderator as "the world's foremost expert" on my topic. This was flattering, but inaccurate. When we perpetuate this idea that experience in our research area equals expertise, it causes historical methodology and the pursuit of knowledge to recede from view. This brings us back to the positivist/philosophical divide and often positions historians on the wrong side of this question. Historians have also become more ideologically homogenous in some respects, with the effect that we allow the positivist impression of our work to persist but allow the philosophical nature of history to recede. This too I see as a question of methodology and a willingness to politicize our research. Historians who can talk about themselves as feminist historians, historical materialists, or post-colonial historians are referring to politics, but they also explicitly reveal their methodology in a way that says something important. They are referring to historical methods and ways of addressing the past that can speak to other disciplines and build bridges between different types of scholars. We are all being asked repeatedly to think about interdisciplinarity -to build research teams for funding purposes, and to make links to other disciplines. This is impossible if we misunderstand the philosophical foundations of each other's work, but we can't begin to do this without talking clearly about what we do.
The question of interdisciplinarity causes me to encounter similar debates while teaching history to non-history students. In legal studies, we prime our students to expect to draw from law, history, politics, art, among other sources. But for a historian teaching in this field, much of what I teach is historically grounded. Students in a history course will expect to encounter history, no matter where their disciplinary background lies. In contrast, students in legal studies or sociology encountering history require some justification. "Why are we studying so much history?" I am asked this year after year in course evaluations. In the legal studies example, one might return to the above notions about the essential philosophical sameness of history and contemporary social theory. But this argument falls flat in a lecture theatre of undergraduate students. More persuasive is a justification that makes thinking about the past an active pursuit connecting history to the politics of the topic at hand.
This also involves an effort to get students to think about their lives and the modern world differently. In the contemporary academic climate, identity studies are at the forefront of how students are trained in some courses and disciplines. When confronted with the past, students may find that the preoccupations of the modern world do not translate or are ineffective. The challenge is to get students to understand that often when I ask them to think historically, what I mean is that they should think structurally. Thinking structurally about the past is an opportunity for students to consider a problem differently. Kinsey has discussed this as an effort to "historicize," but this is an awkward concept for students. I am asking students to think about the issues raised by Kinsey -historical context and historical contingency. I ask my students at all levels to confront two essential questions when looking at either history or contemporary politics: who decides, and what is the source of that power? This requires not only thinking historically but beginning to interrogate structures of power in the past that continue to weigh upon the present. Beginning to work out the mechanics of such historical contingencies is one way to get students thinking structurally about the past. This too is a quantifiable skill that we can build into learning goals in our classes. It is a method that students can take forward and apply to new situations, new structures of power, and new histories as they encounter them.
Kinsey writes a persuasive overview about the value of argument and interpretation, recognizing that historians make choices when they privilege one account over another. These are the types of considerations that can help to prepare new historians for the debates ahead. The choices historians make are the grist of their arguments, and history students are trained to evaluate one interpretation of the past against another. In a room of non-history students, the matter of choice rests on the shoulders of an instructor who might be offering the only interpretation of history that students will encounter on a subject. Questions arise. Does history in the classroom serve only as historical background? Must the choices of the instructor be transparent to the students? Somebody must decide what interpretation goes forth, what will suffice as enough context and background to understand where a course in legal studies, sociology, or political science might be going. For instructors, this is a private debate: the internalized complexity of history rendered invisible to students who need to understand, for example, the French Revolution, in order to begin thinking through questions about human rights in the modern world. Kinsey's comments on historical contingency are useful to those who teach history. Things are complex. And there is often a catch for people in my position teaching the only history of a subject that students encounter.
In her example, Kinsey discusses the Poor Laws and just how fraught it can be to draw direct lines between one thing and another using superficial historical analysis. So the historian teaching non-history students gets squeezed by multiple forces -by time, by a sense of duty to the totality of a subject, by student impatience with having to hear lectures about history in the first place. But the students will also chafe against explanations and histories that point only to complexity and no real answers, and so the instructor comes back to making choices about which history, and how much of it. My solution to some of these choices is to engage students in doing the work of the historian to begin working out the structures of the past. The French Revolution is a useful example. How can an instructor get students to see the French Revolution as a turning point in the modern world in a way they can carry forward and apply to both modern politics and law? Kinsey's points about contingency are essential. We can put students in the shoes of politicians and philosophers who lived through this period and commented on the events of the eighteenth century as contemporary politics. I introduce the essential facts of the events and then set students loose to read John Locke and Edmund Burke. They complain bitterly, but those who invest their time and try to see this century through Locke and Burke's eyes come away with a sense of the politics of this history that does not tie into a tidy knot with the death of the French king. There will be more to read later, but this is a start.
Historians should heed Kinsey's call to enter this conversation about our work. My practical advice is to think about ourselves through the eyes of others, particularly non-historians, both academics and students. 
